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Abstract Biological technologies are becoming an
important part of the economy. Biotechnology already
contributes at least 1% of US GDP, with revenues growing
as much as 20% annually. The introduction of composable
biological parts will enable an engineering discipline
similar to the ones that resulted in modern aviation and
information technology. As the sophistication of biological
engineering increases, it will provide new goods and ser-
vices at lower costs and higher efﬁciencies. Broad access to
foundational engineering technologies is seen by some as a
threat to physical and economic security. However, regu-
lation of access will serve to suppress the innovation
required to produce new vaccines and other countermea-
sures as well as limiting general economic growth.
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Welcome to the Paleobiotic Age. Just as today we look
back somewhat wistfully on our quaint Paleolithic—liter-
ally ‘‘old stone’’—ancestors, so will our descendants see
the present age as that of ‘‘old biology’’, inhabited by Pa-
leobiotic Man. The technologies we use to manipulate
biological systems are experiencing dramatic improvement
(Carlson 2003; Newcomb et al. (2007), and as a result are
driving change throughout human economies.
In order to understand the impact of our growing eco-
nomic dependence on biological technologies it is worth
taking a moment to consider the meaning of economy.
‘‘Economy’’ is variously thought of as, ‘‘the management
of the resources of a country, especially with a view to its
productivity’’ and ‘‘the disposition or regulation of the
parts or functions of any organic whole; an organized
system or method’’.
1 Amid a constantly increasing demand
for resources, we look to technology to improve the pro-
ductivity of labor, to improve the efﬁciency of industrial
process and energy production, and to improve the yield of
agriculture. Very tritely, we look to technological innova-
tion within our economy to provide more stuff at lower
cost. Biological technologies are increasingly playing that
role.
What is the bio-economy, and how big is it?
The title of this commentary is, of course, behind the times;
we already have a thriving bio-economy. Without high-
yield agriculture, human society would be severely limited,
and without access to the fossil remains of prior life on
Earth, now mined as petroleum, coal, and methane, we
would be impoverished further still. Estimates of the total
annual contribution of biology to the economy vary;
between US$ 350 billion
2 and 1 trillion (Pimentel, per-
sonal communication) are produced by the U.S. food and
agricultural sectors; pharmaceutical sales are approxi-
mately US$ 600 billion worldwide and 250 billion within
the US (Herper and Kang 2006). A small, but rapidly
growing, fraction ot the total constitute products made
using biotechnology.
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2 The latest data is from 2004, and the US economy has been growing
at about 4% per year. See The Statistical Abstract: http://www.census.
gov/compendia/statab/
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used by the press and industry observers in limited and
inconsistent ways. Those words may be used to describe
only pharmaceutical products, or in another context only
the industry surrounding genetically modiﬁed plants, while
in yet another context a combination of biofuels, plastics,
chemicals, and plant extracts. The total economic value of
biotechnology companies is therefore difﬁcult to assess,
and it is challenging to disentagle the component of reve-
nue due each to public and private ﬁrms.
Based on surveys from Nature Biotechnology, the U.S.
Government, various organizations in Europe, and several
private consulting ﬁrms, what follows is my integrated
rough assessment of where the money is for industrial
biotech, agbiotech, and biopharmeceuticals (also known as
‘‘biologics’’). Estimates of total revenues range from US$
80 to 150 billion annually, where the speciﬁc dollar value
depends strongly on which set of products are included.
The various surveys that provide this information differ not
only in their classiﬁcation of companies, but also in
methodology, which in the case of data summarized by
private consulting ﬁrms is not generally available for
scrutiny. Further complicating the situation is that results
from private biotech ﬁrms are self-reported and there are
no publicly available documents that can be used for
independent veriﬁcation. One estimate, based on data from
2004 (explicitly excluding agricultural, industrial, and
environmental biotech ﬁrms), suggested approximately
85% of all ‘‘biotech’’ companies are private, accounting for
a bit less than 50% of employment in the sector and 27% of
revenues (Hodgson 2006).
As of 2006, biologics accounted for about US$ 65 bil-
lion in sales worldwide, with about 85% of that in the U.S.
and a 20% annual growth rate over the last ﬁve years
(Herper and Kang 2006; Aggarwal (2007). Genetically
modiﬁed crops accounted for another US$ 6 billion, with
industrial applications (including fuels, chemicals, materi-
als, reagents, and services) contributing another US$ 50–
80 billion, depending on who is counting and how. Annual
growth rates over the last decade appear to be 15–20% for
medical and industrial applications, and 10% for agricul-
tural applications. After sifting through many different sets
of numbers, I estimate that revenues within the U.S. are
presently about US$ 125 billion, or approximately 1% of
GDP, and growing at a rate of 15–20% annually. While this
torrid pace will ultimately slow, it is clear neither when this
will happen nor how large a fraction of U.S. GDP biotech
could ultimately provide. The introduction of carbon
accounting in regional and national economies could dra-
matically increase our reliance upon carbon-neutral,
renewable resources and manufacturing. The ﬁnal eco-
nomic contribution of biotech will depend in large part on
the ulimate capabilities of new biological technologies.
Where do we go from here?
We are beginning to use biology in new ways to provide
food, energy, materials, and improved health care. Our
challenge is to stay on the path of improving both produc-
tivity and our general quality of life while simultaneously
improving both safety and security. How should we organize
ourselves to encourage innovation in biological technologies
so as to best manage our resources, improve our security,
and beneﬁt the human condition?
We must answer this question in the midst of substantive
and dramatic transitions in the way we manipulate organ-
isms. Builders of synthetic biological systems are starting
to draw on engineering experience and infrastructure honed
in 20th century technological revolutions. An important
historical lesson now contributing to our present techno-
logical economy is the utility of standardized, composable
parts—parts with deﬁned, and therefore predictable, func-
tionalities that enable design and assembly based on
speciﬁcations alone.
Combining composable parts with modeling and assem-
bly tools enables the existing design-to-build economy for
airplanes, cars, and myriad other products, where in silico
testing precedes transfer of Computer Aided Design (CAD)
ﬁles to Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAM) production
machinery. These design-to-build processes not only reduce
manufacturing costs and increase the productivity of
designersbutalsofacilitaterapidphysicalimplementationof
new ideas. This methodology deﬁnes modern rational engi-
neering. Applied to biology, it provides a distinctly different
way of producing a new design than does either tinkering or
the combination of processes that deﬁnes evolution. While
the development of mature biological equivalents of CAD,
CAM, and interchangeable, composable parts is still some
ways off, this is the clear goal of academic and industrial
efforts around the globe (Endy 2005).
The transition from paleo- to neo-biotic is unlikely to be
easy, rapid, or obviously discrete. While there is great
potential in bringing engineering practices to biology,
signiﬁcant investment in engineering fundamentals is
required ﬁrst (Endy 2005). The DOE-sponsored report,
‘‘Genome Synthesis and Design Futures: Implications for
the U.S. Economy’’ (Newcomb et al. 2007), charts analo-
gies between the technological and economic development
of biology and eighteenth through twentieth century
examples of railroads, electric power grids, aviation, and
computers. Before a design-to-build bio-economy arrives,
there must be models that accurately and consistently
predict the behavior of new systems, test and measurement
gear to verify those behaviors, and new industrial-scale
assembly and distribution mechanisms.
Even without this infrastructure, biological production is
already proving to be less expensive and more efﬁcient
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chemicals and materials (for a review, see (Newcomb et
al.2007)). A great deal of investment has recently been
made to discover whether the same trend holds true for bio-
production of fuels. But before all of this comes to pass, an
economy based on the rational engineering of biological
systems requires a library of composable parts with deﬁned
behaviors.
The history of the last three centuries demonstrates that
healthy technological economies are not built on one-off
constructions, but rather upon hierarchical systems of parts
and methods that when pulled off the shelf and assembled
in combination produce many functions:
Each component system or assembly of a technology
itself has a purpose, an assignment to carry out. If not,
itwouldnotbethere.…Andeachassemblyhasitsown
subassemblies or components. Each of these in turn
has an assignment to carry out. Each also is a means—
a technology. This pattern, that a technology consists
of building blocks that are technologies, that consistof
further building blocks that are technologies, repeats
down to the fundamental level of individual compo-
nents. …Practically speaking it means that a
technology is organized in a loose hierarchy of
groupings or combinations of parts and subparts that
themselves are technologies. This hierarchy can be as
many as ﬁve or six layers deep (Arthur 2007).
Explicitly applying this thinking to the modiﬁcation of
biological systems brings the demonstrated capabilities of
rational engineering to a powerful and growing set of
composable parts:
By enabling innovation through combination across a
wide range of biological components and modules,
synthetic biology could radically change the land-
scape of biotech innovation. The power of innovation
through combination of existing components is
already demonstrable in technology domains such as
combinatorial chemistry, electronics, and software,
where decades of innovation have built on previous
developments (Newcomb et al. 2007).
The economic impact from these sectors is likely to be
recapitulated through building up an infrastructure of
composable parts for engineering novel biological systems.
The biological world we see out the window works in a
similar, though not identical, way.
Terrestrial life reuses a nearly universal set of nucleic
acids, amino acids, peptide domains, and general classes of
whole proteins and metabolic pathways. It appears that
historical examples of natural biological innovation—i.e.,
evolution—often follow genome replication mistakes that
introduce repeated genes, in turn followed by reuse and
remodeling of the newly redundant proteins and circuits to
implement new capabilities.
However, the time scales on which biological systems
produce and test new combinations—new designs—are
quite different than those required of a technology in
human hands. Natural biological innovation is constrained
on short time scales by growth and replication of individ-
uals and on long time scales by ecological and geological
changes that put pressure on populations. Except in very
specialized applications, for example, recombination in
vertebrate immune systems that results in novel antigen
binding domains, paleobiotic mechanisms to produce new
combinations of parts through horizontal gene transfer,
homologous recombination, or sex, tend to be slow com-
pared to the lifetime of an individual.
In contrast, neobiotic design and construction by human
hands must respond to the demands of the human economy,
including safety and security concerns, where product
development costs are quantiﬁed in units of person-days
and denominated in the local currency. The product cycle
for computing and communications equipment is about
eighteen months today and for consumer electronics only
about six months; new design and manufacturing cycles are
often scheduled to start as soon as an initial product run is
loaded into crates for shipping to market, creating an
inexorable march of product model numbers. There is ever
greater pressure to churn out faster, more capable widgets
and gizmos, while margins are constantly being squeezed
both by low cost competition and by ever decreasing costs
for the basic technology. It remains difﬁcult to apply these
notions to biological engineering because many successful
projects to date come from academic laboratories, where
costs are often externalized as part of existing infrastruc-
ture and where labor is artiﬁcially cheap. Yet, even as
measured in the context of relatively few products with
discernable dollar value, there is clearly considerable pro-
gress to note.
The new (and old) clothes of synthetic biology
‘‘Synthetic biology’’ was, until recently, a phrase found in
literature at least decades old (Szybalski and Skalka 1978),
ﬁrst appearing nearly a century earlier (Keller 2002), but
not used much in the last thirty years. In the year 2000
there was no International Genetically Engineered
Machines competition (iGEM), no Biobricks Foundation,
no Synthetic Biology N.0 meetings, and no discernable
funding structure; there was only a glimmer of a strategy
for using composable parts to build biological systems with
predictable behaviors.
The scientiﬁc landscape has shifted dramatically in the
last eight years. While putting the name Synthetic Biology
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direction of research, it attracted signiﬁcant numbers of
students, focused discussions, and provided a rallying point
for a number of people striking out into unknown territory.
Today, academic programs or departments dedicated to
synthetic biology are emerging in national laboratories and
universities, with quite different intellectual roots and
ultimate goals than traditional Bioengineering programs.
iGEM has grown from ﬁve schools and 30 students in 2005
to almost 60 teams in 2007 comprising more than 500
students from dozens of countries. The National Science
Foundation has funded the Synthetic Biology Engineering
Research Consortium (SynBERC) to the tune of US
$20 million, and companies that synthesize new genes and
engineer synthetic circuits have received tens of millions
more in funding.
If this is what is possible in only seven years, with the
greatest change coming in the last two or three, then the
future is likely to bring tumult as never before. Yet practical
applications are by no means left waiting for iGEM and
SynBERCtosupplynewtechnologyandskilledresearchers.
In 2006, Amyris Biotechnologies received a US$
20 million investment speciﬁcally for direct production in
microbes of fuels and fuel precursors, and recently received
the ﬁrst tranche of B Series ﬁnancing to the tune of US$
70 million.
3 The company is pursuing microbial produc-
tion of a general aviation fuel comparable to Jet-A, and
within three to four years the product could compete with
petroleum at prices as low as $45 a barrel (Singer 2007).
Achieving this goal could open up a presently proprietary
3.2 billion gallon per year market—the U.S. Air Force is
planning to replace at least half its petroleum-derived JP-8
with synthetic fuels by 2010 (Phillips 2007).
Amyris is by no means alone in this effort. LS9 has
received signiﬁcant investment for the microbial produc-
tion of ‘‘Renewable Petroleum’’ and of hydrocarbon fuels,
and SunEthanol is focused on improving the yield from the
‘‘Q Microbe’’, Clostridium phytofermentans (Warnick et
al. 2002), an anaerobic microbe that coverts cellulose to
ethanol with a surprisingly high efﬁciency.
Assuming these companies are successful, it is worth
considering the resulting impact on the liquid fuels market,
and more generally the effects on structure of the economy
as a whole.
The economic considerations of scaling up direct
microbial production of biofuels are fundamentally and
radically different than those of traditional petroleum
production and reﬁning. The costs associated with ﬁnding a
new oil ﬁeld and bringing it into full production are con-
siderable, but are so variable, depending on location,
quality, and local government stability, that they are a poor
metric of the average required investment. A very
straightforward measure of the cost of increasing supplies
of gasoline and diesel is the fractional cost of adding
reﬁning capacity, presently somewhere between US$ 1 and
10 billion for a new petro-cracking plant, plus the ﬁve or so
years it takes for construction and tuning the facility for
maximum throughput. Even increasing the capacity of
working facility is expensive. Shell recently announced a
US$ 7 billion investment to roughly double the capacity of
a single, existing reﬁnery (Seba 2007).
In contrast, the incremental cost of doubling direct
microbial production of a biofuel is more akin to that
incurred in setting up a brewery, or at worst case a phar-
maceutical grade cell culture facility. This puts the cost
between US$ 10,000 and 100,000,000, depending on size
and ultimate complexity. Facilities designed to produce
ethanol by traditional fermentation and distillation can cost
as much as US$ 400 million.
4 Pinning down the exact
future cost of a microbial biofuel production facility is
presently an exercise in educated speculation. But, for both
physical and economic reasons, costs are more likely to be
on the low end of the range suggested above.
This is particularly true for a fuel like butanol. While
distilling or ﬁltering alcohol from the fermented mix would
reduce the palatability of beer, it is absolutely required to
produce fuel grade ethanol. However, unlike ethanol,
butanol has only a limited miscibility in water and therefore
does not require as much energy to separate. If an organism
can be built to withstand the *8% concentration at which
butanol begins to phase-separate, the fuel could simply be
pumped or skimmed off the top of the tank in a continuous
process. Costs will fall even further as production eventu-
ally moves from alcohols to hydrocarbon biofuels that are
completely immiscible in water. Moreover, beer brewing
presently occurs at scales from garages bottling of a few
liters at a time to commercial operations running fermenters
processing thousands to many millions of liters per year.
Thus, once in possession of the relevant strain of microbe,
increasing production of a biofuel may well be feasible at
many scales, thereby potentially matchedclosely tochanges
in demand. Because of this ﬂexibility, there is no obvious
lower bound on the scale at which bio-production is eco-
nomically and technically viable.
Towards distributed biological production
The scalability of microbial production of biofuels depends
in part on which materials are used as feedstocks, where
3 See http://www.amyrisbiotech.com/news_091907.html
4 See ‘‘BP, ABF and DuPont Unveil $400 Million Investment in UK
Biofuels’’: http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968
&contentId=7034350
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the site of production. Petroleum products are a primary
feedstock of today’s economy, both as a raw material for
fabrication and for the energy they contain. Bio-production
could provide fuel and materials from a very broad range of
feedstocks. There is no obvious fundamental barrier to
connecting the metabolic pathways that Amyris and other
companies have built to produce fuels to the metabolic
pathways constructed to digest cellulose for ethanol pro-
duction, or to the pathways from organisms that digest
sewage. Eventually, these biological components will
inevitably be enhanced by the addition of photosynthetic
pathways. Conversion of municipal waste to liquid biofuels
would provide a valuable and important commodity in
areas of dense human population, exactly where it is nee-
ded most. Thus microbial production of biofuels could very
well be the ﬁrst recognizable implementation of distributed
biological manufacturing (Carlson 2001).
While transportation fuels are an obvious early target for
commercialization of synthetic biology and metabolic
engineering, it will eventually be possible to treat biomass
or waste material as feedstocks for microbes producing
more than just fuels. Dupont and Genencor have con-
structed an organism that turns starch into propanediol,
which is then polymerized into a ﬁber called Sorona now
successfully competing in the market against petroleum
products. Sorona’s competitive advantage comes from
building biology into the production process, resulting in
an integrated system that is approximately a factor of two
more efﬁcient than the industrial process it replaces, while
consuming considerably less energy and resulting in lower
greenhouse gas emissions.
5 The production pathway starts
in microbes, and requires a more traditional facility to
polymerize the propanediol. As a result, Sorona is now
competing in a multibillion dollar market at a substantial
operating advantage, with only US$ 110 million invested
in the ﬁnishing facility and of order US$ 10 million (my
estimate) in developing the microbe.
But this is just the ﬁrst step in implementing biological
manufacturing, and it is important to highlight the contrast
with technologies to come. More and more of the total
production of economically important compounds will
soon be ‘‘miniaturized’’ within biological systems, inter-
nalized within single-celled (and eventually, multi-celled)
organisms. There is substantial funding behind these
efforts.
To much fanfare, BP recently invested US$ 500 million
in the Energy Biosciences Institute (EBI), a ten-year
project to develop new biofuel technologies at UC Berke-
ley, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and
Lawrence Berkeley Labs. A signiﬁcant fraction of the
funds pledged to the EBI are reportedly to be used for
building new fuel production and processing pathways in
modiﬁed organisms.
Closer to commercialization, Amyris Biotechnologies
and Allylix are both working on the generalized imple-
mentation of microbial synthesis of terpenoids, a broad
class of compounds with myriad industrial and healthcare
uses. As a measure of the complexity of what is now
possible, Amyris’ production pathway for artemisinic acid
was assembled in yeast using ten genes from four organ-
isms. As of spring 2007, the company had demonstrated a
billion-fold improvement in yield in about six years; it
would be difﬁcult to ﬁnd a comparable example of yield
improvement in human industrial processes during the last
two hundred years. This is just a hint of the potential for
biological production as more parts are included in syn-
thetic systems.
Every month, and every iGEM, brings news of synthetic
systems of surprising complexity—systems that function
more or less as intended. But the difference between
‘‘more’’ and ‘‘less’’ is the crux of many concerns about the
future. The behavior of many synthetic biological systems
is still difﬁcult to predict, a state of affairs likely to persist
for some time. Whether synthetic vaccines, genetically
modiﬁed crops, or simple summer projects, systems com-
posed of many poorly deﬁned components, and their poorly
deﬁned interactions, are bound to display unexpected
behaviors.
The importance of recognizing biology as a human
technology
Crucial to the future development of technologies used to
manipulate biology is the explicit acknowledgement by
practitioners, policy makers, and consumers that biology is
itself a technology. As such, biological technology requires
a decision-making process, based on the best available
data, to evaluate the wisdom of particular implementations.
No bridge, dam, airplane, car, or computer is today built in
developed economies without an evaluation of failure
modes and consequent impacts. There are, of course,
exceptions to this way of doing business. Risk factors and
impacts may be ignored or overlooked, resulting in build-
ings or bridges that collapse, cars that tend to roll over or
explode in collisions, genetically-modiﬁed cotton plants
whose boles fall to the ground for mysterious reasons, and
gene therapies that, rather than cure, cause disease or kill.
Design and construction standards for large and visible
infrastructure are easy to police because it is hard to
5 ‘‘Corn used as raw material for plastic bottle and fabric,’’
EngineerLive.com, October 1, 2006;http://www.engineerlive.com/
european-chemical-engineer/safety-in-the-plant/13234/corn-used-as-
raw-material-for-plastic-bottles-and-fabrics.thtml
Laying the foundations for a bio-economy 113
123practice anything resembling civil engineering while
incognito. Similarly, when cars or airplanes cost lives, or
when medical personnel cause injury, these red ﬂags are
relatively easy to spot and those responsible tend to be held
accountable according to the precepts of local legal
systems.
In evaluating such consequences of bad decision-mak-
ing, and in drafting regulations or legislation to improve
safety, we must distinguish between technological stum-
bles and negligence. There is a great difference between a
plane crash resulting from failure of the air trafﬁc control
system, or mechanical failure of a faulty or poorly main-
tained part, and a crash resulting from phenomena that
were not previously understood as important in the engi-
neering process, such as metal fatigue or wind shear. Lives
may be lost in all cases, but differentiating individual
negligence from collective ignorance is a key role of
existing criminal and civil justice systems, legislation and
administrative rules. It is by no means clear that extra
regulation is needed in the case of biological technologies.
Building a safe and strong bio-economy I:
the applicability of current laws
In general, there are two types of restrictions on actions in
our society. The ﬁrst type, coming into play before any
action is taken, consists of limits on practicing certain
skills, in the form either of legislation by the state or of
professional certiﬁcation. The second type comes in the
form of remediation once action results in physical, eco-
nomic, or social harm. But it is a very different style of
regulation to restrict access to, or outlaw use of, biological
technologies than to penalize harm to property or person
resulting from negligent or premeditated use of those
technologies. And it is by no means clear who should be
subject to regulation or certiﬁcation.
A case can be made that engineers or artisans designing
synthetic biological systems for healthcare, or vaccines, or
even houses, should perhaps be required ‘‘sign their
drawings’’ as professionals. But this begs the question of
what to do about hobbyists and do-it-your-selfers. While
even those who remodel their own houses are subject to
building codes, there are always places where codes do not
exist, are not enforced, or are not enforceable. The lesson is
that where access to tools and skills is ubiquitous, those
who choose to do things their own way can always ﬁnd a
place, or a set of conditions, that allow them to express
themselves or to experiment. The level of intrusive sur-
veillance required to monitor everyone who wants to build
glow-in-the-dark bacteria would in all likelihood be
exceptionally expensive, and probably infeasible even
within the U.S. (Carlson 2003) As more parts become
available in the Biobrick registry, and as more people have
general access to a combination of sequence speciﬁcations
and synthesis, the task of enforcement resulting from
restricted access or practice will become increasingly
untenable.
The DNA synthesis industry is attempting to bring dis-
cussion of risks and beneﬁts of different governance
strategies into the public spotlight:
A governance framework that stymies the open
commercial development of synthesis technology
will retard research and make the challenge of
responsibly developing the technology more difﬁcult.
Likewise, a regulatory framework that hampers a
single country’s or group of countries’ commercial
market without international consensus will drive
consumers to the most facile and cheapest available
source, and have a limited impact on enhancing
global security (Bugl et al. 2007).
These recommendations are informed by the desire for
safety and security, the rapid pace of technological inno-
vation, and the wide global distribution of oligonucleotide
synthesis technologies and gene assembly methods. In such
a context, implementing regulation of technologies that are
already broadly distributed inevitably drives innovation by
users of those technologies. As I ﬁrst noted in 2003,
attempts to control production of illicit drugs continue to
provide an excellent example of the effects of regulation on
proliferation (Carlson 2003).
Building a safe and strong bio-economy II:
the unintended negative consequences of restricting
access to distributed technologies
Despite a recent signiﬁcant increase in domestic arrests and
prosecutions, U.S. consumption of methamphetamine
continues to increase.
6 The total number of methamphet-
amine-associated ‘‘clandestine laboratory incidents’’
actually declined sharply in 2006,
7 but the consequent
reduction in supply by ‘‘mom and pop’’ producers has been
more than offset by a combination of increased centralized
domestic production and imports, both of which appear to
be in the control of large criminal organizations.
8 Cen-
tralized production and the greater ﬂow of drugs across
U.S. borders is consistent with the argument that policing
6 See the Drug Enforcement Agency’s Statistics Page at:
http://www.dea.gov/statistics.html
7 DEA statistics. See http://www.dea.gov/concern/map_lab_seizures.html
8 National Drug Threat Assessment 2007: http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/
concern/18862/index.htm
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and evidently very effective, black-market drug manufac-
turing and distribution networks. Thus increased
enforcement efforts are paradoxically producing an infra-
structure that is, according to the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency, ‘‘[M]ore difﬁcult for local law enforcement
agencies to identify, investigate, and dismantle because
[it is] typically much more organized and experienced than
local independent producers and distributors.’’
9
The relevance of this observation to building a secure
and robust bio-economy is twofold. First, methamphet-
amine is a manufactured product, and attempts to constrain
manufacturing have resulted in both greater production
capacity and greater market opacity. As has always been
the case in policing and intelligence work, information is
the key to successful enforcement or defense, respectively.
Therefore, looking forward to the bio-economy, maximiz-
ing the free ﬂow of information to authorities is crucial for
security, perhaps even at the cost of allowing access to
technology and skills by individuals who are the subject of
concern by those same authorities.
Second, focusing regulation on the supplier, rather than
the buyer, does nothing to alter demand but rather displaces
production elsewhere and enhances substitution. Moreover,
attempts to constrict supply, and the consequent prolifer-
ation of alternatives, can arise from not just from regulation
but also from economic conditions. From the perspective of
security, this problem is simply exacerbated when the
subject of the transaction has value beyond the buyer, as is
the case in the marketplace for synthetic genes. There is a
clear and growing demand for synthetic genes not for their
own sake, but for their value in producing materials and
fuels that have even greater economic value. Thus any
bottleneck, whether economic, technical, or regulatory, in
turning electronic sequence speciﬁcation into physical
DNA will simply encourage alternate supply in an already
international market. This dynamic is developing in the
gene synthesis market sooner than I expected (Newcomb
et al. 2007).
The market is deﬁning a niche for rapid
and conﬁdential DNA synthesis
The cost advantage held by a small number of synthesis
companies funnels many orders to their foundries, but the
extant structure of proprietary gene synthesis is already
causing some dissatisfaction among customers. First, par-
ties interested in building synthetic genetic circuits or
organisms are uncomfortable with exposing proprietary
designs to scrutiny by any potential competitor, or any
third party with a potential conﬂict of interest. This would
include all gene synthesis companies that aim as part of
their strategy to build design services atop their synthesis
business. Second, while multi-gene length sequences are
now usually delivered within two or three weeks, this delay
has already become the rate-limiting step for design cycles
in synthetic biology companies. That is, the quest to ﬁeld a
marketable product is slowed by delivery times for out-
sourced DNA fabrication, which simultaneously requires
exposure of proprietary design work and strategy to outside
observers.
This effect is at least an implicit goal of those who
consider centralized gene synthesis to be a security
advantage. Low-cost, high-volume, centralized foundries
are said to allow for more effective screening of orders for
sequences of concern. But the combination of intellectual
property (IP) issues and inefﬁciencies caused by lengthy
delivery times will undoubtedly create a market for alter-
native synthesis technologies. As a result, I suspect there
will soon exist, if it doesn’t already, a market for desktop
gene synthesis instruments even at a premium price
point.
10 These instruments would eliminate IP concerns
and could provide signiﬁcant cost savings (primarily in
labor) as genes are produced in house in days rather than
weeks.
The role of government funding and regulation
An ability to rapidly innovate within commercial contexts
is just one component of the bio-economy. Regulatory and
funding environments are crucial components of the sys-
tem, with government setting priorities by its preferences.
But the massive funding supplied by governments should
be put in perspective. While signiﬁcant government sup-
port was crucial to the eventual success of aviation and of
desktop computers, in both cases commercialization was
driven in large part by innovators operating literally in
garages.
In early years of aviation, many critical components—
primarily control systems, power plant design, and con-
struction techniques—were demonstrated before
government funding for the industry materialized in the
U.S. Financial support from the government was, in any
event, originally available in the form of procurement
contracts for functioning aircraft rather than as support for
research. The development of the technology underlying
personal computers received enormous government
9 See ‘‘Methamphetamine Strategic Findings’’: http://www.usdoj.
gov/dea/concern/18862/meth.htm‘#Strategic
10 Note that the probable emergence of a market for such an
instrument constitutes a hypothesis, and time will provide the
experimental test.
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ufacturing and design, and display technology, but it took
innovation by individuals in start-up companies to suc-
cessfully design, assemble, and demonstrate a market for
the precursors to today’s powerful machines. The notion
that innovation in synthetic biology could be maintained in
spite of limited access to tools and skills is based on a
misunderstanding of the history of innovation in the 20th
Century.
Driving innovation in biological technologies
Whether at the hands of Michael Dell, Steve Jobs and
Steve Wozniak, the Wright Brothers, Otto Lilienthal,
William Boeing, or the yet-to-be-named transformative
individuals working in biology, successful innovation
requires wide access to both technology and a multitude of
parts. Innovation requires, in effect, a healthy ecosystem
consisting of people, ideas, and a great many more pieces
than those provided by individual innovators. In other
words, innovation requires an existing set of ideas or things
that provide the context for the last piece to fall into; that
ﬁnal piece is just one of many. Moreover, as Scott Berkun
makes clear in the recently published The Myths of Inno-
vation, for any given invention or particular scientiﬁc
advance to have an impact it has to get it into the mar-
ketplace and into the hands of people who will use it;
‘‘While there is a lot to be said for raising bars and pushing
envelopes, breakthroughs happen for societies when inno-
vations diffuse’’(Berkun 2007). Diffusion of an innovation
through a society relies on a complex set of interactions
that play out at the intersection of the actual technical
advance and factors much larger than any individual or
group providing that innovation:
Systems that foster proliﬁc innovation through com-
bination are not just technical; other preconditions
include economic, social, and regulatory frameworks
that determine the appropriability of value by inno-
vators and intellectual property systems that can
support the creative accumulation of innovations over
time (Newcomb et al. 2007).
Even when all the requisite preconditions are met,
technologies can take many decades to penetrate an
economy, particularly in the context of pre-existing
investment in alternatives or cultural resistance. Biological
technologies will be no different, even in circumstances
where a biological process is dramatically more efﬁcient or
less expensive. Yet when synthetic biology enables suc-
cessful rational genetic modiﬁcation of plants, animals, and
then humans—that is, modiﬁcation based on predictive
models—there will be an enormous uproar. Today’s
scufﬂes over stem cells and gene therapy will pale in
comparison.
However, when it truly becomes possible to build
microbes that programmably kill tumors, when it becomes
possible to control the growth of new tissues and organs
from donor-speciﬁc stem cells, when human health and
longevity are positively impacted by synthetic biology,
there will be a rush to implementation that will overwhelm
cultural resistance and, because of the distributed nature of
both technology and skills, may very well undermine
existing regulatory structures.
The beneﬁts of exploring this frontier are both excep-
tionally promising and, even after three decades of
developing recombinant DNA technologies, largely and
frustratingly elusive. But the work will continue because
the possibility of improved crop yields, increased meat
production, plentiful biofuels, and improved human health
through new vaccines and replacement tissues are too
scientiﬁcally, politically, and economically enticing for
humans to resist. And as in any other ﬁeld, the implications
of a mature biological technology will take decades to play
out and to appreciate.
Conclusion
In this, the Paleobiotic Age, our society is only just
beginning to struggle with all the social and technical
questions that arise from a fundamental transformation of
the economy. History holds many lessons for those of us
involved in creating new tools and new organisms and in
trying to safely integrate these new technologies into an
already complex socio-economic system. Alas, history also
fails to provide examples of any technological system as
powerful as rational engineering of biology. We have
precious little guidance concerning how our socio-eco-
nomic system might be changed in the Neobiotic Age to
come. We can only attempt to minimize our mistakes and
rapidly correct those we and others do make.
The coming bio-economy will be based on funda-
mentally less expensive and more distributed technologies
than those that shaped the course of the 20th Century. Our
choices about how to structure the system around bio-
logical technologies will determine the pace and
effectiveness of innovation. As with the rest of the natural
and human built world, the development of this system is
decidedly in human hands. To paraphrase Stewart Brand
(1968): We are as engineers, and we’d better get good at
it in a hurry.
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